Participation in crop insurance programs is lowered by imperfect knowledge resulting in adverse selection and moral hazard problems. We aim at investigating how experience in insurance contracts may influence participation in the Italian crop insurance market. From Italian farm-level data we estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of participation to investigate the role of experience. The methodology, coupled with exploratory analysis of the data, allows one to compare the relevance of different sources of experience in the crop insurance decision making process. We found that experience tend to be a catalyst for insurance participation. Policy implications are discussed: in particular we discuss on the importance of bolstering uptake to exploit the advantages of the inertia and spillover effects that emerge from experience. To the best of our knowledge, the role of experience has been underinvestigated. Our analysis has the specific contribution of modeling the potential role of experience (exploited after buying an insurance contract) on uptake in crop insurance programs.
Italy has a long tradition of farm subsidies, but has had difficulty in achieving crop insurance participation. Participation in Italian crop insurance programs is generally low: around 15% of farmers participate in crop insurance programs. High costs of bureaucracy, ineffectiveness of Defense Consortia, and lack of experience with crop insurance contracts are some of the factors that have contributed to keep uptake low and farmers reluctant to participate in crop insurance programs. Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) argue that imperfect knowledge and asymmetric information are likely to play a substantial role in the insurance decision-making process, and are potential drivers of low participation 2 (Chiappori and Salanie, 2013) . Analyzing the automobile insurance market, Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997, p.75 Put differently, the role of experience on uptake in crop insurance programs is not much discussed, and has not been quantified. Indeed, as follows from Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) and Chiappori and Salanie (2013) , experience is likely to be important. Little evidence has been provided on 3 the role of experience in the crop insurance decision making process. Indeed, learning by doing and learning by watching others are mechanisms that may stimulate technology adoption in agriculture ( Conley and Udry, 2010) , and they are likely to help reducing the imperfect and asymmetric information that characterize insurance markets (Chiappori and Salanie, 2013) .
Understanding the determinants of uptake is an important goal for European Union (EU) policymakers, and exploring the role of experience (and information) is a promising area of research. Several empirical inquiries deserve investigation: Does imperfect information discourage participation in crop insurance markets? What is the influence of experience on participation? We investigate if and how experience (i.e. buying crop insurance contracts) may help enhancing uptake.
The analysis is devoted to assess the role of experience through a dynamic model of participation and a detailed 7-years firm-level panel of Italian farms.
We show that experience in crop insurance is positively related with uptake.
The rationale is that the experience acquired in past harvest seasons is likely to reduce the imperfect knowledge on both sides, and thus enhance uptake.
Our conclusions pose emphasis on suggestions for a better implementation of policy interventions at EU and national levels. Starting in 2000, the Consorzi di Difesa were introduced in order to facilitate the match of supply and demand in the subsidized crop insurance market, and to facilitate the transition from mono-risk to pluri-risks contracts.
The Italian crop insurance system
In 2004, the Legislative Decree No. 102/2004 modified the intervention from ex post compensations to ex ante subsidies, introduced pluri-risks and multirisks contracts (that three or all adversities) and ended the subsidies to monorisk (i.e. single-peril) contracts. Starting from 2014 the insurance policy must cover at least three climatic adversities eligible for pluririsks policies. The pluririsks policies ensure farmers against losses due to three or more climatic adversities, which need not be mutually exclusive. The multi-risks policies ensure against losses due to any type of climatic adversity included in the Annual Insurance Plan (Piano Assicurativo Annuale). Currently, the Italian crop insurance policies are subsidized through EU funds: subsidies were as high as 80% of the insurance premium for policies against damages (reaching at least 30% of assured production) caused by adverse weather conditions and other natural disasters, and it is up to 50% of the cost of the premium if the insurance contract also covers other losses caused by adverse weather conditions that are not considered to be widespread natural disasters, or losses caused by animal or plant diseases. Since 2010, due to the EU Reg. 73/2009, the subsidies have been decreased to 65%. In 2015 a new set of contracts has been offered an replace the previous system: types A, B and C offer coverage against different combinations of infrequent perils, frequent perils, and additional adversities. The indemnities paid for mono-and pluririsks policies are computed through qualitative and quantitative assessments of the percentage of losses due to the insured adversities; the multi-risk pol-icy, also known as yield insurance, compensates farmers for losses when the realized yield is below the average historical yield by a certain threshold 1 .
The market structure consists of one public-private coinsurance pool, twenty-five private insurance companies, and several mutual/cooperative entities participating in the agricultural insurance system (Mahul and Stutley, 2010) . While (private) insurance companies may set their own premium rates, the companies coordinate pricing policies and the maximum levels of insurance premiums eligible for a subsidy, with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Participation level and imperfect knowledge
In order to increase uptake, crop insurance programs are usually incentivized: premia are subsidized and the set of subsidized policies is generally widened.
A drawback of leveraging crop insurance demand with subsidies is due to the increasing marginal costs that derive from the inclusion of farmers that have low propensity of being insured. According to Glauber (2013) Imperfect and asymmetric information (i.e. lack of information on farmer and/or insuree side), through adverse selection (i.e. self-selection of riskier farmers to enter the insurance market) and moral hazard (i.e. riskier behavior adopted by insured farmers), are the main factors that help explain low participation in insurance markets (Chiappori and Salanie, 2013 ). On one side riskier insurees have private knowledge on the risks they face and they find profitable to insure at the rate that insurers set for average-risky customers. Such adverse selection mechanism pushes insurers to compensate their financial exposure by setting higher rates (Goodwin and Smith, 2013; Glauber, 2013) 2 . On the other side, insurers have private knowledge on the type of contract they offer 3 , at the detriment of clarity and transparency of contracts to farmers Salanie 2000, 2013) . A third channel through which imperfect knowledge disfavors participation consists of high transaction costs implied by heavy bureaucracy -the cumbersome process to obtain subsidies for the premium, to claim reimbursements for yield losses, and the delays in payments for subsidies and claimed losses. This channel disfavors participation of farmers who are vulnerable to liquidity constraints.
In all these cases the imperfect knowledge is likely to be resolved (at least partially), under the insurance contract, at the end of the harvest season. In other terms, a farmer who has stipulated an insurance contract will reveal (at the end of the season, through his decisions and production strategies) some of their private knowledge in terms of riskiness. On the other hand, the insurer will also reveal to the insured farmer (at the end of the season, by honoring the contract) some of their own private knowledge on the goodness of the contract. Finally, both the insurer and the farmer will gain experience on the bureaucracy of insurance at the end of each season. All in all, it is likely that the more contracts are stipulated, the higher the experience on both sides, the lower the frictions due to imperfect knowledge. A similar mechanism has been hypothesized and tested in automobile (Cohen, 2005) 
Empirical setting
We use a reduced form expression of the probability for farmer to stipulate an insurance contract (regardless of the type of insurance contract, that is regardless of buying a single-peril or a multi-peril contract) as function of 
We assume that the familiarity with an insurance scheme may play a role in the decision-making process. Experience is gained after buying an insurance contract, regardless of the payment of an indemnity. A farmer who is better informed on the functioning of insurance contracts may be more or less willing to adopt crop insurance, depending on how well the insurance program works, and on how much are the net benefit (or loss) for 2017). Hence, a priori we cannot conclude on the role of familiarity with the program. 4 Familiarity (Ω i,t = {Experience i,t }) is gained through experience: 4 We gratefully acknowledge the comments of the reviews on two aspects of our model. First, the model is free of assumptions on aversion or propensity toward risks. Second, our model is not able to disentangle the effects of the experience of the insurer and of the experience of the insuree in that they both work in the same direction (i.e. solving the imperfect information). a farmer (i) gains experience by participating in the program.
A number of control factors have been adopted for two specific reasons:
first, the dataset we used contains a limited number of variables; second, we adopted variables that have been adopted and have been found relevant in 
Experience
Farmers take advantage of gained experience to make their decision on insurance. Experience is gained by insuring and thus collecting information on how the program works. We assume experience can be purely transitory (if the knowledge accumulation process has very short memory), or permanent (if the knowledge accumulation process has infinite memory) 5 .
If experience is purely transitory, farmers only benefit from the information gained in the previous year, and the variable transitory experience reduces to the lagged dependent variable:
On the contrary, if experience is permanent, the information gained through insurance lasts forever, therefore the timing of insurance is not relevant once farmers have purchased insurance. The variable permanent experience reduces to an indicator function equal to one if the lagged dependent variable has been one at least once in previous periods:
with T standing for the total number of years.
Econometric specification
Our 
A linear approximation of equation for participation in crop insurance
contracts can be easily estimated:
Given that the probability of being insured (P rob(
is not observed, and experience is gained through participation (e.g. Experience i,t = Insurance i,t−1 ), the model is estimated as a dynamic probit model.
It is worth noting that even if the error terms of the probit model are assumed serially independent, there exists serial correlation induced by the time-invariant term (µ i ) 6 . Since the dependent variable (I it ) is a binary variable (the decision to insure or not), we normalize it by imposing a unitary value for the variance of the error term (σ 2 u = 1). The model requires an assumption on the relationships between the initial observation (Insurance i,1 ) and the unobserved heterogeneity (µ i ). The simplest solution is to assume the initial observation exogenous, but this is a strong assumption for the vast majority of datasets, whose start period does not coincide with the start of the process 7 . If the initial observation is correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity, the standard Random Effects (RE) probit estimator is inconsistent and overestimates γ (i.e. the state dependence is overestimated). Following Heckman (1981), we use a reduced form equation for the initial observation (Insurance i,1 ) with instruments (X i,1 ) which includes the set of explanatory variables (Experience −i,1 , Z i,1 ) for the main model and exogenous instruments (x i,1 ). The instruments are assumed to be correlated with the random effects and uncorrelated with the error term.
We evaluate the estimates by computing the average partial effects (APE) of state dependence (Insurance i,t−1 ). We multiply the coefficientγ µ by a weighted sample average of the distribution: 6 This specification implies equi-correlation between v i,t = µ i + u i,t in any two different
We may also estimate a more general model by relaxing the assumption of no autocorrelation of the error term. The model requires T-dimensional integrals of normal densities but, although feasible, it requires a great computation effort (Stewart, 2005) . The estimates of the state dependence coefficient are generally slightly lower, therefore the model we estimate represents an upper bound, a conservative measure to not overestimate the effects of experience. 7 If the assumption is correct, the model can be estimated as a standard Random Effects (RE) Probit Model.
where the subscript µ indicates that the parameter need to multiplied 
See table 2
Our dataset provides yearly information on land size (i.e. the number of cultivated hectares), altitude (a dummy equal to one if the farm is located 600 meters above sea level), farmers' age (expressed in years), diversification of farming activities (a dummy equal to one if the number of cultivated crops in one year is larger than one), adoption of irrigation (a dummy equal to one if the farm is partially or entirely irrigated). The variable "Revenue
Variability" is obtained as standard deviation of farms' revenue (over the entire period, 2004-2010), and expected premium per hectare 8 . We do not observe farm-level premium rates. We compute the variable "Expected Premia" by averaging, across Regions and farming systems, the crop-specific total premia. The aggregate premium is a proxy of the premium farmers are expected to pay, and a proxy for the level of riskiness for all farms of a given type and located in a specific region. The approach is similar to that adopted by Goodwin (1993) and Santeramo et al. (2016) . Descriptive statistics of control factors are shown in tables 3.
See table 3
The average farm size in Italy is rather small. For instance, the average size of farms in Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Lombardia and Piemonte, home well known agro-food products, is only eighteen hectares, compared to an average size of US farms that is twenty five times larger (500 hectares). A vast majority of farms are not insured, and not irrigated with percentage at regional level that do not exceed, respectively, 23 and 43 percent (excluded Liguria).
Experience
As preliminary analysis we investigate whether data support the presence of asymmetric information (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000) : we found that the (average) variability of production for insured farmers exceeds the (average) variability of production for uninsured farmers. The analysis does not allow us to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard, but is valid to conclude that insured farmers have larger variability in production and therefore asymmetric information is likely to exist (Einav, Finkelstein and Levin, 2010).
The estimates using a pooled probit model, a standard random effects probit model and a random effects model a-la-Heckman confirm that the effects of experience are overestimated if simple estimators are adopted (table   4 ). While the signs of control factors are unaltered over the three estimators, the coefficients for experience are much larger if a pooled or a standard random effects probit model is adopted. The pooled probit estimates ignore the cross-correlation between the individual composite errors in different periods. When we control for the endogeneity of initial conditions (Heckman, 1981; Stewart, 2005) , the effect is largely reduced. We estimate all remaining models with the Heckman model.
See table 4
We compute average partial effects (APE) for experience. A consistent estimator for the APE is the change in the probability distribution (PDF) function evaluated at the sample mean, after normalization of the maximum likelihood (MLE) coefficients. Empirically, we multiply the MLE parameters by (1+σ 2 µ ) −1/2 , and evaluate the PDF under different values for "Experience" at the sample mean 9 .
The measures for experience are positive and statistically significant. As we should expect, farmers who have experienced crop insurance contracts are much more likely to purchase insurance with respect to farmers who have never experienced insurance contracts, even if located in Regions where crop insurance programs are popular. Farmers with experience in crop insurance are 10% more likely to buy insurance with respect to a previously uninsured farmer.
Transitory experience is stronger than permanent experience: the likelihood of purchasing insurance is as high as 10% if farmers have experienced insurance during the previous season, and only 3.5% if they had experience in earlier seasons See table 5 Other factors influence participation in crop insurance markets. We found that large and irrigated farms are more likely to be insured, while farms 9 Knowing that λ = located at high altitude are less likely to be insured. The results are consistent with the existing literature on crop insurance (Goodwin, 1993; Enjolras and Sentis, 2011; Foudi and Erdlenbruch, 2012; Singerman, Hart and Lence, 2012) 10 . In addition we observe a positive correlation between participation in insurance schemes with the variables "revenue variability" and "expected premium": the higher the revenue variability, the higher the likelihood of stipulating an insurance contract; the higher is the expected premium, which reflects a higher level of underlying risk, the higher is the participation in crop insurance program. This seemingly counterintuitive result is explained by the crop data scarcity which imposes higher premiums in Italy (Shen et al., 2016) . In order to disentagle the effects of premiums we would need to rely on expert knowledge of the degree of riskiness: unfortunately, those data are not available.
Conclusions
Risk management tools have a long history in the EU. Despite this, and the strong emphasis that the current Common Agricultural Policy has posed on risk management tools (namely subsidized crop insurance, Mutual Funds and Income Stabilization Tool), the participation in crop insurance programs in the EU has been low for decades. Several frictions are likely to lower uptake. We use a detailed farm-level dataset to investigate a determinant that has received relatively little attention. In particular, we investigate how experience, through learning-by-doing and learning-from-others mechanisms, influence the crop insurance decision making process.
We conclude that experience in crop insurance tends to increase participation: in other terms, we found that farmers who have experienced crop insurance tend to insure in the subsequent years. The mechanisms we postulate is that the experience acquired during the previous harvest season is likely to reduce the imperfect knowledge and acts as catalyst for participation.
To the extent that increasing participation is an important goal for policymakers and insurance companies, reducing the imperfect knowledge through ad hoc measures (e.g. information campaigns, thematic workshops, may
prove an effective strategy that should be encouraged at the EU, national and local levels.
We conclude with few sentences on possible limitations of the present study. First, the external validity of our results is limited by the lack of information about the type of contracts stipulated. However, even if such data were available, the main results should not change: the asymmetric information between farmers and insurers is partially resolved through experience, and this in turn stimulates insurance coverage renewals. Second, the present study does not take into account potential spill-over effects that may be in- p-values in brackets. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
We control for land size, altitude, farmer age, revenue variability, crop diversification, irrigation, and expected premia per hectare. The last column reports the APE. The estimate of λ implies that 61% of the composite error variance is due to individual-specific effects. The parameter, estimated as a logit transformation (ln(λ 1−λ )), is computed as follows: λ = eλ 1+eλ . A value of θ statistically greater than one indicates that the composite error (v it ) is correlated with the individual-specific effects. p-values in brackets. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05 Reported coefficients are APEs. We control for land size, altitude,farmer age, revenue variability, crop diversification, irrigation, and expected premia per hectare. Land size is expressed in hectares, age in years, sigma revenues is expressed in mln of euro, and expected premium per hectare in .000 of euro. Altitude, diversification and irrigation are dummy variables.
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